In a classic result, Jakobsson (1976) and Fellman (1976) showed that average-rate progressive, and only average-rate progressive, income taxes reduce income inequality.
Introduction
The link between income inequality and progressive taxation uncovered in the seminal works of Jakobsson (1976) and Fellman (1976) has long been considered a fundamental normative foundation for income tax progressivity.
1 In a recent paper, Carbonell-Nicolau and Llavador (forthcoming) extended the classic result of Jakobsson (1976) and Fellman (1976)- according to which average-rate progressive, and only average-rate progressive income taxes, reduce income inequality-to the case of endogenous income. There it was shown that marginal-rate progressivity-in the sense of increasing marginal tax rates on income-is a necessary condition for tax structures to be inequality reducing, and necessary and sufficient conditions on the social utility function were identified under which progressive and only progressive taxes are inequality reducing. While this result circumvents the difficulties and the negative results emphasized by other authors in their attempts to incorporate the disincentive effects of taxation (see, e.g., Allingham (1979) and Ebert and Moyes (2003, 2007) ),
it remains silent about the families of social utility functions for which subclasses of the set of all progressive tax schedules are inequality reducing. This paper identifies necessary and sufficient conditions on social preferences ensuring that various subclasses of progressive taxes are inequality reducing. The results obtained here are strict generalizations of those in Carbonell-Nicolau and Llavador (forthcoming) and confer a degree of useful flexibility on the theory, in that they allow the analyst to expand the universe of social preferences by suitably restricting the set of progressive taxes. As an illustration of the results' practical implications, we provide a precise characterization of the subclass of (progressive) taxes that are inequality reducing for some standard families of preferences.
Preliminaries
The setting is the same as that of Carbonell-Nicolau and Llavador (forthcoming). There are n individuals. The social utility function is given by a continuous utility function denote the marginal rate of substitution of labor for consumption, where
We assume that for each c > 0, 
The set of all utility functions satisfying the above conditions is denoted by U .
progressivity (see, e.g., Kakwani (1977) ; Hemming and Keen (1983) ; Eichhorn et al. (1984) ; Liu (1985) ; Formby et al. (1986) ; Thon (1987) ; Latham (1988) ; Thistle (1988) ; Moyes (1988 Moyes ( , 1994 ; Le Breton et al. (1996) ; Ebert and Moyes (2000) ; Ju and Moreno-Ternero (2008) ).
We restrict attention to nondecreasing and order-preserving piecewise linear tax schedules.
.., K}, t k = t k+1 whenever k ∈ {0, ..., K − 1} and K ≥ 1, and 0 = y 0 < · · · < y K . A (K + 1)-bracket piecewise linear tax schedule is a real-valued map T on R + uniquely determined by (α 0 , t, y) as follows:
Here T(y) is interpreted as the tax liability for gross income level y. We write (α 0 , t, y) and the associated map T interchangeably. Note that for K = 0, (α 0 , t 0 , y 0 = 0) is a linear tax with intercept α 0 and marginal tax rate t 0 ; for K = 1, (α 0 , (t 0 , t 1 ), (y 0 , y 1 )) is a two-bracket tax with intercept α 0 , marginal tax rates t 0 and t 1 , and bracket threshold y 1 ; and so on.
The set of piecewise linear tax schedules is denoted by T .
An ability distribution is a vector a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ R n ++ such that a 1 ≤ · · · ≤ a n . The set of all ability distributions is denoted by A .
An agent of ability a > 0 who chooses l ∈ [0, 1] units of labor and faces a tax schedule T ∈ T consumes c = al − T(al) units of the good and obtains a utility of u(c, l). Thus, the agent's problem is
Because the members of U and T are continuous, for given u ∈ U , a > 0, and T ∈ T , the optimization problem in (2) has a solution, although it need not be unique. A solution function is a map l
The pre-tax and post-tax income functions associated to a solution function l u , denoted by y u : R ++ × T → R + and x u : R ++ × T → R + respectively, are given by The following condition was introduced by Mirrlees (1971, Assumption B, p. 182 ) and termed agent monotonicity by Seade (1982) .
The set of all the members of U satisfying agent monotonicity is denoted by U * .
An income distribution is a vector z = (z 1 , ..., z n ) ∈ R n + of incomes arranged in increasing order, i.e., z 1 ≤ · · · ≤ z n .
Given two income distributions z = (z 1 , ..., z n ) and z = (z 1 , ..., z n ) with z n , z n > 0, we say that z is at least as equal as z if z Lorenz dominates z , i.e., if
For u ∈ U * , and given pre-tax and post-tax income functions y u and x u , an ability distribution a = (a 1 , ..., a n ) ∈ A and a tax schedule T ∈ T determine a pre-tax income
and a post-tax income distribution
In the absence of taxation, i.e., if
The following is the central notion of inequality reducing tax schedule.
Definition 3. Let u ∈ U . A tax schedule T ∈ T is income inequality reducing with respect to u, which we denote as u-iir, if x u (a, T) Lorenz dominates y u (a, 0) for each ability distribution a := (a 1 , ..., a n ) ∈ A and for each pre-tax and post-tax income functions y u and x u .
The results
The notion of progressivity used here is as follows.
Definition 4.
A tax schedule T ∈ T is marginal-rate progressive if it is a convex function.
The set of all marginal-rate progressive tax schedules in T is denoted by T prog .
Now the following subclasses of T prog can be defined. Given K ∈ Z + , B ⊆ R + and subsets
progressive tax schedules (α 0 , (t 0 , ..., t K ), (y 0 , ..., y K )) ∈ T prog with intercept α 0 , marginal tax rates t 0 , ..., t K with t k ∈ R k for each k ∈ {0, ..., K}, and bracket thresholds y 1 , ..., y K , i.e.,
2 Under the agent monotonicity condition, in both cases the vector components are arranged in increasing order. See Carbonell-Nicolau and Llavador (forthcoming).
We now recapture a result from Carbonell-Nicolau and Llavador (forthcoming).
Theorem 1 (Carbonell-Nicolau and Llavador (forthcoming, Theorem 1)). Given u ∈ U * , a tax schedule in T is u-iir only if it is marginal-rate progressive.
Definition 5. A tax schedule T ∈ T is linear if T(y) = −b + r y for all y ∈ R + and some b ≥ 0 and r ∈ [0, 1).
The set of all linear tax schedules in T is denoted by
Given u ∈ U , let T u-iir be the set of all u-iir tax schedules in T .
The following result generalizes Theorem 2 in Carbonell-Nicolau and Llavador (forthcoming). It can be proven using an adaptation of the proof of Theorem 2 in Carbonell-Nicolau and Llavador (forthcoming). The details are provided in the Appendix.
For B ⊆ R + , define
T lin , and Theorem 2 immediately gives Theorem 2 in Carbonell-Nicolau and Llavador (forthcoming).
Corollary 1 (to Theorem 2). Given u ∈ U * , T u-iir = T prog if and only if the members of T lin are u-iir.
When T is a linear tax schedule in T lin with T(y) = −b, where
Since u is strictly quasiconcave on R ++ × [0, 1), for each (a, b) ∈ R ++ × R + , there is a unique solution l u (a, b) to (3). For given b ≥ 0, the derivative of the map a → l u (a, b) exists for all but perhaps one a > 0 (see Carbonell-Nicolau and Llavador (forthcoming)).
this is the elasticity of income with respect to ability at ability level a and endowment b.
Given B ⊆ R + and R ⊆ [0, 1), let U (B, R) be the set of all u ∈ U * satisfying the following condition:
The following result generalizes Theorem 3 in Carbonell-Nicolau and Llavador (forthcoming). The proof is relegated to the Appendix.
Theorem 3. For u ∈ U * , the members of T lin (B, R) are u-iir if and only if u ∈ U (B, R).
Let U denote the class of utility functions u ∈ U * satisfying the following two conditions:
From the proof of Theorem 3 in Carbonell-Nicolau and Llavador (forthcoming), U (R + , [0, 1)) = U , and in this case Theorem 3 immediately gives Theorem 3 in Carbonell-Nicolau and Llavador (forthcoming).
Corollary 2 (to Theorem 3). For u ∈ U * , the members of T lin are u-iir if and only if u ∈ U .
Now combining Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 yields the following result, which refines
Corollary 3 in Carbonell-Nicolau and Llavador (forthcoming).
Applications
In this section we characterize the subclasses of progressive taxes that are inequality reducing for two commonly used families of income-leisure preferences: the CES and the quasilinear preferences. The CES utility function (often in its Cobb-Douglas version) is very common in the literature on life-cycle models (Heckman and MaCurdy, 1982; French, 2005; Blundell et al., 2016) , while static models with fixed costs traditionally work with quasi-linear preferences (Cogan, 1981) . 3 These utilities are also dominant in surveys and textbooks on labor supply and fiscal policy (Pencavel, 1986; Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986; Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1987; Keane, 2011; Blundell et al., 2016) .
CES utility
Consider the well-know CES utility function
where β is a positive constant. One has Proof. Since u ∈ U * , given b ≥ 0, B * := {b ∈ R + : b ≥ b}, and R ⊆ [0, 1), Theorem 4 gives
.
Arranging terms gives
This simplifies to
We claim that if sup R < 1 there exists 
holds.
Given b ≥ 0 and γ < 0, the bracketed term on the left-hand side of (5) is positive and the right-hand side of (5) divided by the bracketed term on the left-hand side of (5) converges to infinity as a tends to infinity. Consequently, there exists (a, b, r) ∈ R ++ × B * × R with , the right-hand side of (5) is positive, the bracketed term on the left-hand side of (5) is positive for a large enough, and the right-hand side of (5) divided by the bracketed term on the left-hand side of (5) converges to infinity as a tends to infinity. Therefore, there exists (a, b, r) ∈ R ++ × B * × R with (5) is positive and the and the righthand side of (5) divided by the bracketed term on the left-hand side of (5) is increasing in a and converges to rβ 2 as a → ∞. Consequently, it suffices to set b = β 2 sup R ≤ β 2 .
4
If γ ∈ ( 1 2 , 1), the bracketed term on the left-hand side of (5) is positive for large enough a, and the right-hand side of (5) divided by the bracketed term on the left-hand side of (5) tends to 0 as a → ∞, and so if sup R < 1 there exists b such that for (a, b, r) ∈ R ++ × B * × R with ( 
and consumption and leisure become perfect substitutes. As γ tends to −∞, the indifference curves become "right angles," i.e., the social utility function regards the two goods as perfect complements.
Proposition 1 states that when the elasticity of substitution is large enough, i.e., when consumption and leisure substitute "sufficiently well" for each other, there are (nonempty) subclasses of progressive tax schedules whose members are inequality reducing. Specifically, in this case it suffices to choose a sufficiently large subsidy for a progressive tax schedule to be inequality reducing. Hence, the elasticity of income to ability must decrease and not all progressive taxes are income inequality reducing (Theorem 3 and Corollary 1).
In order to capture the intuition for this result, recall that a necessary and sufficient condition for the containments T prog (B * , R) ⊆ T u−iir ⊆ T prog to hold is that u ∈ U (B * , R), and consider first the opposite extreme case when consumption and leisure are perfect complements. Because leisure is bounded above by 1, utility has an upper bound, with
(1, c * ) as the optimal bundle, where c * is the "ideal" consumption level corresponding to 
and since 0.75a
and b ≥ b, it follows that (7) holds.
Figure 2: Perfect substitutes. Individual choice for different ability levels and exogenous income b. Individuals with a sufficiently high ability, like a , choose zero leisure; while those with sufficiently low ability, like a , choose zero labor. Hence, the elasticity of income to ability is non-decreasing and all progressive taxes are income inequality reducing (Theorem 3 and Corollary 1).
maximum leisure (see Figure 1) . Individuals of higher ability, whose consumption entails a lower opportunity cost in terms of leisure time, choose higher consumption levels. As a grows large, the optimal consumption level converges to c * . Hence, for a sufficiently large ability, the change in consumption (and hence in income) with respect to ability increases less than proportionally in ability. This implies that the elasticity of income with respect to ability must decrease at some point, and so u ∉ U (B * , R).
At the other extreme, when consumption and leisure are treated as perfect substitutes, higher ability individuals will choose zero leisure and low ability individuals zero labor, implying that the elasticity of income with respect to ability is not decreasing (Figure 2 ).
For non-extreme cases, when consumption and leisure are not good substitutes, one can always find individuals of sufficiently high ability for whom the elasticity of income with respect to ability decreases, as in the case of perfect complements. Alternatively, when consumption and leisure substitute relatively well, the elasticity condition is satisfied for sufficiently high ability levels and can also be guaranteed for low ability agents by equalizing their incomes with a sufficiently large subsidy. Hence the condition B * in the statement of Proposition 1. 
Quasi-linear utility
Consider the quasi-linear utility function
where β > 0 and δ > 0, with δ = 1. 6 One has
and . Note that θ(a) > 1 for a ≥ β, and θ r (a) > 1 for Proof. Since u ∈ U * , given b ≥ 0, B * := {b ∈ R + : b ≥ b}, and R ⊆ [0, 1), Theorem 4 gives
Using θ(a) > θ r (a) > 1, and arranging terms, we obtain
where K(r) := (1 − r) −1/δ − 1 (1 − r) > 0 for all r ∈ (0, 1), and ϕ(a) :
We claim that if sup R < 1 there exists
only if δ ∈ (0, 1). To see this, it suffices to show that (i) for δ > 1 and b ≥ 0, there exists (a, b, r) ∈ R ++ × B * × R with a > β such that (9) does not hold; and (ii) for δ ∈ (0, 1), there exists
Given b ≥ 0 and δ > 1, ϕ(a) converges to infinity as a tends to infinity, and consequently, there exists (a, b, r) ∈ R ++ × B * × R with a > β such that (9) does not hold. For the quasi-linear utility function, the parameter δ determines the inverse of the elasticity of leisure with respect to ability, so that leisure is elastic for δ < 1 and inelastic for δ > 1. 7 Proposition 2 states that when the demand of leisure is inelastic, any progressive tax schedule is inequality reducing once an appropriate subsidy is chosen.
The intuition for this result is related to that for the CES utility function. Observe that consumption and leisure become perfect substitutes for δ = 0, and that the degree of substitutability decreases as δ increases. 8 As δ → 0, the demand of leisure becomes perfectly elastic, with consumption and leisure becoming perfect substitutes. High ability individuals choose zero leisure and low ability individuals zero labor, implying that the elasticity of income with respect to ability is not decreasing. (Recall Figure 2 .) For δ < 1, leisure demand is elastic and an ability increase leads to a more than proportional leisure decrease, producing a larger increase in income for sufficiently large ability levels, and satisfying the elasticity condition for sufficiently large ability levels. The elasticity condition can also be guaranteed for low ability individuals by equalizing their incomes with a sufficiently large subsidy. Hence the condition B * in the statement of Proposition 1.
Concluding remarks
This paper characterizes social preferences for which various subclasses of progressive tax schedules are inequality reducing. The framework considered here, which subsumes that in Carbonell-Nicolau and Llavador (forthcoming), allows one to expand the set of social preferences by suitably restricting the set of progressive taxes. This is illustrated in Section 4 for two standard families of utility functions: the CES and the quasi-linear utility functions.
Indeed, the characterizations in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 state that when the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure is large enough, it suffices to choose a sufficiently large subsidy for a progressive tax schedule to be inequality reducing. In this regard, while the relevant parameter regions may differ across families of social preferences, our discussions in Section 4 suggest that the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure crucially determines the existence of nonempty subclasses of inequality reducing tax systems. Take T = (α 0 , t, y) ∈ T prog (B, (R k )) and, for each income threshold y k of T, define the linear tax schedule T k (y) := t k y−α k with α 0 ∈ B, t k ∈ R k for k ∈ {0, ..., K}, and α k :
Pre-tax and post-tax income functions, y u and x u , are uniquely defined, since preferences are strictly quasiconcave and the tax function T is convex. For k ∈ {1, ..., K}, define the abilities a − k and a k such that
and a k := max a : y(a, T k ) = y k (see Figure 3) . Lemma 1 guarantees that a − k and a k exist and are well-defined for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
Furthermore, since T is marginal-rate progressive (and hence t k−1 < t k for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}), agent monotonicity (Definition 2) implies that a
Next, define the following family of sets covering (0, +∞):
A := (0, a
, a k , a
, [a K , +∞) .
We first show that condition (10) is satisfied for ability distributions contained in each element of the family A. 
Combining equations (11)- (14) we obtain (10) for every a ∈ A . 
